When in the mind of man appetites and aversions, hopes and fears, concerning one and the same thing arise alternately, and diverse good and evil consequences of the doing or omitting the thing propounded come successively into our thoughts, so that sometimes we have an appetite to it, sometimes an aversion from it, sometimes hope to be able to do it, sometimes despair or fear to attempt it, the whole sum of desires, aversions, hopes and fears, continued till the thing be either done or thought impossible, is that we call Deliberation. (33)
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Ed. Edwin Curley. Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 1994.
My decision to add this entry was based on, in part, a consideration of the difference between what is called deliberation and what is called thinking:
Thinking is not so much an act as a way of living or dwelling - as we in America would put it, a way of life. It is a remembering who we are as human beings and where we belong. It is a gathering and focusing of our whole selves on what lies before us and taking to heart and mind these particular things before us in order to discover in them their essential nature and truth.i
If "the most thought-provoking thing about our thought-provoking age" is "that we are still not thinking," it has always been thus since the early Greeks. As he [Heidegger] makes clear in this volume [What Is Called Thinking], Heidegger is neither pessimistic nor optimistic about the times in which we live. It is only that the nature of our technological age requires thinking more than earlier ages, for modern man conceives himself prepared to take dominion over the earth and his capacities for good and ill are vastly augmented.ii
While related, deliberation and thinking are not the same nor do they necessarily occur simultaneously or, for that matter, at all.
More about learning how to think at Aretaic.
Leviathan is one of my favorite reads and, for what it's worth, I prefer the Edwin Curly edition. His introduction is thorough and insightful as are his notes found throughout the text. If you want to read Leviathan, this edition is worth considering. Plus the size is nice at 8.5 x 5.5 inches - feels good in the hand, familiar.
i Heidegger, Martin. What Is Called Thinking. Trans. J. Glenn Gray. Harper Perennial, 2004. xi.
ii ibid. ix.
You ask about the effects of my work on others. If I may wax ironical, that is a masculine question. Men always want to be terribly influential, but I see that as somewhat external. Do I imagine myself being influential? No. I want to understand. And if others understand - in the same sense that I have understood - that gives me a sense of satisfaction, like feeling at home. (6)
Hannah Arendt: The Last Interview and Other Conversations. Brooklyn: Mellville House Publishing, 2013.
Works and Days
This selection is from the interview "What Remains? The Language Remains": A Conversation with Günter Gaus. Zur Person, ZDF TV, Germany - October 28, 1964. Translation by Joan Stambaugh.
There is only one resistance, the resistance of the analyst. The analyst resists when he doesn’t understand what he is dealing with. He doesn’t understand what he is dealing with when he thinks that interpreting is showing the subject that what he desires is this particular sexual object. He’s mistaken. What he here takes to be the objective is just a pure and simple abstraction. he’s the one who’s in a state of inertia and of resistance.
In contrast, what’s important is to teach the subject to name, to articulate, to bring this desire into existence, this desire which, quite literally, is on this side of existence, which is why it insists. If desire doesn’t dare to speak its name, it’s because the subject hasn’t yet caused this name to come forth.
That the subject should come to recognise and to name his desire, that is the efficacious action of analysis. But it isn’t a question of recognising something which would be entirely given, ready to be coapted. In naming it, the subject creates, brings forth, a new presence in the world. He introduces presence as such, and by the same token, hollows out absence as such. It is only at this level that one can conceive of the action of interpretation. (228-9)
Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book II: Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954-1955. Trans. Sylvana Tomaselli. Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. 1991.
Desire - specifically, the Lacanian concept (désir) - is a key component of my approach to art. This includes, among other elements, the Session, training and education, and the Aretaic framework.
In the text of Lacan's Seminar XI (The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis) its translator, Alan Sheridan, provides some useful context for understanding the concept:
The human individual sets out with a particular organism, with certain biological needs, which are satisfied by certain objects. What effect does the acquisition of language have on these needs? All speech is demand; it presupposes the Other to whom it is addressed, whose very signifiers it takes over in its formulation. By the same token, that which comes from the Other is treated not so much as a particular satisfaction of a need, but rather as a response to an appeal, a gift, a token of love. There is no adequation between the need and the demand that conveys it; indeed, it is the gap between them that constitutes desire, at once particular like the first and absolute like the second. Desire (fundamentally in the singular) is a perpetual effect of symbolic articulation. It is not an appetite: it is essentially excentric and insatiable. That is why Lacan co-ordinates it not with the object that would seem to satisfy it, but with the object that causes it (one is reminded of fetishism). (278-9)